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Abstract
House prices crash has become an important feature of macroeconomic crisis. We
argue that house prices crash driven by contractionary monetary policy is not only a
reaction to crisis, but also accelerates and amplies the uctuations of major macroeco-
nomic variable. In this paper, we conduct a case study of Hong Kong in the 19971998
nancial crisis and quantitatively analyze the mechanism by developing a general equi-
librium model incorporating nancial accelerator mechanism into both household and
entrepreneur sectors. After estimating and simulating the model, impulse response re-
sults imply that our model can explain the co-movement of house prices, consumption,
and investment better than the alternative models.
I. Introduction
House prices uctuations have become one increasingly prominent characteristic of eco-
nomic crisis. The recent nancial crisis in the United States was caused by the collapse of
the housing market, which propelled the U.S. economy into the Great Recession. In fact,
researchers have already noted that conditions in the real estate market played a major
role in the rapid meltdown in the Southeast Asian nancial crisis beginning in 1997 (John
Quigley, 2001). A notable fact in Hong Kong during this crisis is a slump in consumption
and investment in tandem with a sharp decline in house prices (Figures 1 and 2). However,
quantitative studies based on a general equilibrium framework on this issue are still rare.
This paper aims to delve into this area by establishing and estimating a general equilibrium
model incorporating nancial accelerator to understand the interactions between real estate
market uctuations and the aggregate economic dynamics during the Hong Kong nancial
crisis. Throughout this paper, we will focus on the following two questions: (1) What kind of
mechanism causes house prices crash? (2) How do house prices inuence the macroeconomic
variables, including output, consumption, and investment?
We nd two empirical evidences that are closely related to our questions. The rst
concerns the source of the continuing decline in house prices during a recession. Getler et
al. (2004) argued that the increase in the world interest rate forced the central bank to
raise the domestic interest rate to maintain the xed exchange rate regime. Therefore, the
unexpected uplift of the world interest rate is the root that provoked the Southeast Asian
nancial crisis. There is no fundamental or institutional problem in Hong Kong, hence we
argue that the shock that dampened the Hong Kong housing market in the Southeast Asian
nancial crisis might also come from monetary policy. To verify the above idea, a bivariate
Bayesian vector autoregression (BVAR) model with Minnesota prior is used to estimate the
impulse responses of both private house price index and private o¢ ce price index following
a shock to interest rate based on a sample period from 1995 to 1999 (Figures 3 and 4). A
positive shock to interest rate leads to persistent decrease in house price indices, which is
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in line with the ndings of Getler et al. (2004). Therefore, it is reasonable that we use the
monetary policy shock as the main shock in our analysis.
The second evidence is related to the question about how house prices impact macroeco-
nomic variables. We argue that their interactions exist not only in Southeast Asian nancial
crisis, but also for the entire sample period from the 1980s to 2010. Figures 5 to 7 dis-
play the estimated impulse responses of output, consumption, and investment following a
shock to house prices. These impulse responses are also estimated from a BVAR model. A
positive shock to house prices stimulates a persistent increase in macroeconomic variables,
among which the response of investment is the most signicant, followed by consumption
and output.
To understand these salient features of the data, we propose a general equilibrium
model based on the nancial accelerator model of Bernanke et al. (1999) (BGG hereafter),
which describes how the credit market channel may form part of the monetary transmission
mechanism. The model focuses on the macroeconomic e¤ects of imperfections in credit
markets. Such imperfections generate premia on the external cost of raising funds, which
in turn a¤ect borrowing decisions. We introduce two distinctive features into the Dynamic
New Keynesian sticky price model with nancial acceleration mechanism. The rst feature
is that we assume that credit constraints exist among households and entrepreneurs. Thus,
both face the optimal nancial contracts and use real estate as collateral to reduce the
agency costs associated with borrowing to nance housing consumption and investment.
The approach is to apply nancial accelerator in BGG model to both the household and
entrepreneur sectors. Thus, the BGG framework links the cost of rms and households
external nance to the quality of their balance sheet. When there is an exogenous interest
rate shock, this unanticipated rise depresses the demand for houses, which in turn decreases
the investment and house prices. The unanticipated decline in house prices decreases the net
worth on the part of both homeowners and entrepreneurs, stimulating the external nance
premium, which in turn further depresses investment. Then, a kind of multiplier e¤ect arises.
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Moreover, the crash in house prices could directly inuence consumption through transfers
and output through the decrease in o¢ ce input. Thus, a shift in housing demand caused by
an interest rate shock can lead to large uctuations in house prices, and produce a broad
impact on consumption, investment, and output.
Another feature of our model, compared with other literature, is the introduction of real
estate producers into the model. Being di¤erent from the nal goods producers, real estate
producers manufacture real estate services using investment (nal goods) and lands without
being constrained on borrowing. This more convincing assumption improves the treatment
of house supply in existing literature, which assumes that house supply is xed.
To evaluate our model quantitatively, we estimate the model using calibration and
Bayesian methods with Hong Kong aggregate time-series data. Compared to models that
only have nancial accelerator in either households or rms, our benchmark model provides
a much better explanation of the co-movements of house prices, investment, and consump-
tion, as well as the persistence of uctuations observed in Hong Kong. Our estimation also
indicates that propagated through nancial accelerators, an interest rate shock alone ac-
counts for about 95% of house prices uctuations, and more than 70% of uctuations in
macroeconomic variables, including consumption and investment.
A strand of recent DSGE literature on house prices assumes that either households or
entrepreneurs are credit constrained, and they use houses or lands as collateral to nance
consumption or investment expenditures (Aoki et al., 2004; Iacoviello, 2005; Iacoviello and
Neri, 2010; Liu, Wang and Zha, 2011). Aoki et al. (2004) assume that houses provide housing
services to consumers and serve as collateral to lower borrowing cost for homeowners. They
show that this nancial friction amplies and propagates the e¤ects of the monetary policy
shock on housing investment, house prices, and consumption. Similarly, Iacoviello (2005) and
Iacoviello and Neri (2010) analyze the relationship between house prices and consumption
based on the idea that consumers are credit constrained, and they use houses as collateral
to nance their consumption. On the other hand, Liu, Wang, and Zha (2011) introduce
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credit constraint into the producer side and explain the positive co-movement between land
prices and investment. Although these models are capable of explaining the interaction
between house prices and consumption or house prices and investment, they have di¢ culty
in delivering positive co-movements of all the three variables simultaneously.
Also, our model is di¤erent from those in other literatures on house prices (Ortalo
Magne et al., 2006; Li et al., 2007; Kiyotaki et al., 2010), which mainly focus on the long-run
trend of house prices by employing the life cycle model. In contrast, we aim to explain house
prices crash in the short run, especially during a recession. Our model is also distinctive
from those in existing literature in terms of the interaction between the housing market and
the macro economy (Case and Shiller, 1988; DiPasquale and Wheaton, 1992). Their concern
is the response of the housing market to aggregate uctuations. Instead, we are interested
in explaining the fact that the housing market could exert great impact on macroeconomic
variables rather than the other way round.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our benchmark model
based on Dynamic New Keyesian sticky price model. Section 3 estimates structural parame-
ters of the model. Section 4 presents the simulation results, drawing comparisons between
alternative models and evaluate the relative importance of shocks. Conclusions are contained
in Section 5.
II. The Benchmark Model
In this section we build a New Keynesian sticky price model incorporating nancial
accelerator mechanism in order to explain the features of the data. The mechanism is antici-
pated to be developed that a positive shock from monetary policy will generate house prices
crash, which amplies and propagates major macroeconomic variables uctuations. Also,
uctuations in macroeconomic variables will further exacerbate house prices decline. The
economy consists of ve types of representative agents: household, entrepreneur, real estate
producer, retailer, and monetary authority. There are three types of commodities: houses
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(or o¢ ces for the entrepreneur), nondurable goods and labor. Each household is treated
as a composite of two behavioral types: homeowner and consumer. Homeowners purchase
houses, and then rent them to consumers. Consumersutility depends on nondurable goods
consumption, housing services and leisure. Entrepreneurs demand o¢ ce and input them as
a production factor to produce wholesales goods. Real estate producers supply houses and
o¢ ces. Retailers di¤erentiate wholesales goods to gain pricing power. Finally, the monetary
authority supports some kind of interest rate rule. Most importantly, borrowing constraints
exist in both household and entrepreneur sectors. As their activities are somewhat conven-
tional, we start with householdsdecision problem.
A. The representative household
The major di¤erence between our model and basic New Keynesian model in household
sector lies on the borrowing constraint in purchasing housing services. To avoid the com-
plexity inherent in modeling the dynamic optimization problem of heterogeneous consumers
under di¤erent borrowing constraints, we follow the method of Aoki et al.(2004). That is,
each household is a combination of two behavioral agents: homeowner and consumer. Ac-
cording to Aoki et al.(2004), this separation has the advantage of making the analysis simple,
but without losing the essence of the nancial accelerator mechanism.
In case of being confused, we rst introduce some useful notations in the model.
1. The CES aggregator of consumption. Consumers demand nondurable con-
sumption goods ct and house services ht. Ct denotes a CES consumption aggregator of the
form
(1) Ct = [
1=c
( 1)=
t + (1  )1=h( 1)=t ]=( 1)
Here nondurable consumption goods ct is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of di¤erentiated
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consumption goods ct(i), indexed by i 2 (0; 1) as
(2) ct = [
Z 1
0
ct(i)
(" 1)="di]"=(" 1)
Hence the corresponding price index for nondurable consumption goods is given by
(3) Pc;t = [
Z 1
0
pt(i)
1 "di]1=(1 ")
Let Pt denotes the composite price index of Ct, which is dened as
(4) Pt = [P
1 
c;t + (1  )P 1 h;t ]1=(1 )
2. Homeowners economic behavior. The house purchase decisions of the house-
hold sector are made by homeowners. At the end of each period, homeowners purchase houses
at price Qt from real estate producers, and then rent them to their consumers at a rental
price Ph;t+1 in the subsequent period. Homeowners nance the purchase of houses partly
with their own net worth available at the end of period t, NHt+1 and partly by borrowing,
bt+1. That is,
qtht+1 = N
H
t+1 + bt+1(5)
qt = Qt=Pt
Homeownersdemand for houses depends on expected marginal return on housing and
expected marginal nancial costs. The expected marginal return Rh;t+1 is given by
(6) Et[Rh;t+1] = Et[
Xh;;t+1 + (1  )qt+1
qt
]
where 0 <  < 1 is the depreciate rate of houses, and Xh;t+1 is the rental price relative
to the composite price index.
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Then we switch to the expected marginal nancial costs. The rst assumption here
is that homeowners are risk neutral. In the environment with asymmetric information,
homeowners face an external nance premium caused by nancial market imperfection when
borrowing. For individual homeowners, the return to houses is sensitive to idiosyncratic
risk. When borrowers announce that they cannot repay the debt, the lenders cannot observe
the realized return unless they pay a xed "auditing cost". Hence the uncollateralized
external nancial cost may be more expensive than internal nance due to this "costly state
verication" problem. Thus the optimal contract will be a debt contract. That is when the
borrower announces he is unable to repay, the lender takes possession of all the borrowers
assets. Following BGGs derivation, the external nance premium can be expressed as a
decreasing function of the net worth to asset ratio, NHt+1=qtht+1, according to the optimal
contract. The optimality condition for homeownersdemand for houses is given by
Et[Rh;t+1] = f(N
H
t+1=qtht+1)Rt+1(7)
f
0
< 0
where Rt+1 is the riskless real interest rate. The assumption of risk neutrality guarantees
that (7) holds for the aggregate level.
Since external nancial premium depends on homeownersnancial condition, the evo-
lution of net worth is the key to determine homeownersdemand on houses. Let V Ht denote
the value of homeowners at the beginning of period t, given by
(8) V Ht = Rh;tqt 1ht   f(NHt =qt 1ht)Rt(qt 1ht  NHt )
Then homeownersnet worth can be dened as
(9) Nt+1 = Vt  Dt
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whereDt is homeownerstransfer to consumers. The transferDt in our model represents
the distribution of housing equity between homeowners and consumers. This setting is to
capture the important economic behavior in the reality that households use their housing
equity to nance consumption. Thus the link between house prices and consumption has
been established. Households face the trade-o¤ between current consumption and future
nance premium. The rise of house prices can increase the transfer and hence consumption
and utility today. However, this also implies a decrease in homeowners net worth, and
an increase in the future nance premium. The optimal allocation should depend on some
factors such as the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and future income uncertainty.
Following Aoki et al.(2004), to make it simple, we set the transfer to be an increasing function
in the net worth of household relative to their assets. That is,
Dt = (N
H
t+1=qtht+1)(10)

0
> 0
3. Consumers economic behavior. There are two types of consumers in our
economy: normal consumers and Rule-of-Thumb(ROT) consumers. Normal consumers have
accumulated enough wealth, thus they make standard intertemporal and intratemporal deci-
sions. ROT consumers dont have su¢ cient wealth to smooth consumption. Their marginal
propensity to consume is higher than that of the former due to borrowing constraints or
impatience. In general, ROT consumers can represent young people in the society.
3.1. The representative normal consumersutility maximization problem is
(11) maxEt
1X
k=0
k[logCpt+k   
(Mp)1+'t+k
1 + '
]
s:t: PtC
p
t +Bt+1 = WtC
p
t +R
n
t Bt + t
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where superscript p denotes normal consumers, Cpt is the consumption of composite
goods, MPt is labor supply, R
n
t is the riskless nominal interest rate, Wt is the nominal wage.
3.2. The income of ROT consumers come from wage income and the transfer paid out
by homeowners. And they will consume all their current income and save none at the end
of each period (Campell and Mankiw, 1989). In order to guarantee enough income, ROT
consumers supply labor inelastically. The consumption of the ROT consumers is given by
(12) Crt = wt +Dt
where superscript r denotes ROT consumers, wt is the real wage.
3.3 The fraction of normal consumers in the economy is 0 < np < 1. Thus, aggregate
consumption is then
(13) Ct = npC
p
t + (1  np)Crt
Correspondingly, the aggregate labor supply is
(14) Mt = npM
p
t + (1  np)
B. The representative entrepreneur
Entrepreneurs combine o¢ ces with labor to produce wholesale products according to a
constant return to scale production function. We describe entrepreneursproduction process
with a Cobb-Douglas production function, given by
(15) Yt = F (Mt; Ot) = AtM1 t O

t
where At is an exogenous technology, Ot is the aggregate amount of o¢ ces purchased
by entrepreneurs in period t  1, Mt is the labor input.
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Similarly, entrepreneurs have the borrowing constraint problem as homeowners in pur-
chasing houses. Entrepreneurs purchase o¢ ces at price Qt in each period for the use in the
subsequent period. However, entrepreneurs cant nance the purchase of o¢ ces solely with
their own net worth. For individual entrepreneurs, the return to o¢ ces is sensitive to idio-
syncratic risk, which is not observable for lenders. Therefore, entrepreneurs face the external
nance premium when borrowing. And the optimal borrowing contract guarantees riskless
real interest rate for lendersexpected return. The demand for o¢ ces depends on expected
return and expected marginal nancial costs. The expected return of o¢ ce Ro;t+1 is dened
as
(16) Et[Ro;t+1] = Et[
Xc;t+1
Xt+1
Yt+1
Ot+1
+ (1  )qt+1
qt
]
where Xc;t is the price of nondurable goods relative to composite goods, Xt is the gross
markup of retail goods over wholesale goods,  is the depreciate rate.
Following BGG, external nance premium is the decreasing function of the ratio of net
worth to assets value in the optimal contract. Be analogous to homeowners, the optimal
demand for o¢ ce is given by
Et[Ro;t+1] = (N
E
t+1=qtOt+1)Rt+1(17)

0
< 0
The dynamic behavior of o¢ ce demand depends on the evolution of entrepreneursnet
worth, Nt+1. The more net worth entrepreneurs have, the more mortgage they can get. Thus
in the equilibrium entrepreneurs can postpone their consumption to accumulate enough net
worth until they dont need to borrow. In order to prevent this, entrepreneurs are assumed
to have a probability  to survive into next period at the end of each period. Entrepreneurs
10
net worth is dened as
(18) NEt+1 = V
E
t +W
E
t
(19) V Et = Ro;tqt 1ot   (NEt =qt 1ot)Rt(qt 1ot  NEt )
where NEt is entrepreneursnet worth, V
E
t is entrepreneursequity. Then entrepreneurs
who fail in period t consume the residual equity which is
(20) CEt = (1  )V Et
C. The representative real estate producer
One feature of our model is the elastic housing supply, which distinguishes our model
from other literatures that assumes xed housing supply (Iacoviello 2005, Liu, Wang and Zha
2011). Real estate producers input land and nal goods to produce housing services. Then
real estate producers sell housing services to homeowners and entrepreneurs at a nominal
price Qt. The production function of houses is given by
(21) Zt = L1 I

z;t
where Zt is the ow of houses, L is the land input, Iz;t is the nal goods input. Fol-
lowing the method of Kiyotaki et al. (2011), the supply of land is xed. This assumption
generates the following mechanism: the more fraction the land value takes in housing value,
the more violently house prices response to the exogenous shock. Peng and Wheaton (1994)
provided empirical evidences supporting this in Hong Kong by econometric tests under the
restriction of land supply set by Hong Kong government. According to the principle of prot
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maximization, the house price Qt is given by
(22) Qt =
1

Pc;tL
 1I1 z;t
The stock of houses Tt is
(23) Tt = (1  )Tt 1 + Zt
Tt can be used as houses or o¢ ces interchangeably. The real estate market clear condi-
tion is
(24) Tt = ht +Ot
D. Retailer
As is standard in literatures, to motivate sticky prices we modify the model to allow for
monopolistic competition retailers. Retailers buy wholesale goods from entrepreneurs, and
then di¤erentiate them. Retailers have the power of pricing and sell their products Yt(i) at
the price Pc;t(i). In each period, only a fraction 1   of retailers are allowed to change their
prices (Calvo,1983). Hence, retailer i choose the optimal price P c;t to maximize the expected
discounted prots
(25) max
1X
k=0
kEt 1[t;k
P c;t   Pwt
Pt
Y t+k(i)]
where t;k =  ctct+k is the household intertemporal marginal rate of substitution, P
w
t =
Pc;t
Xt
is the nominal price of wholesale goods. The aggregate price evolves according to
(26) Pc;t = [P 1 "c;t 1 + (1  )(Pc;t)1 "]
1
1 "
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In the economy, nal goods can be dened as a CES aggregator of retail goods.
(27) Y ft = [
Z 1
0
Yt(i)
(" 1)="di]"=(" 1)
Final goods can be used as nondurable goods consumption, entrepreneursconsumption,
investment and government expenditure. The economy resource constraint is
(28) Y ft = ct + C
e
t + Iz;t +Gt
E. Monetary Authority
Since our mode aims to quantify the responses of house prices and macroeconomic
variables to the monetary policy shock, the existence of monetary authority is necessary. The
monetary authority in our model is assumed to support a Taylor rule. Monetary authority
adjusts the interest rate to meet two aims: targeted ination rate and smoothed interest
rate. When there is an exogenous interest rate shock, the unanticipated rise in nominal
interest rate depresses the demand of houses, which in turn decreases the investment and
house prices. The unanticipated decline in the asset prices decreases net worth in both
homeowners and entrepreneurs part, stimulating the external nance premium, which in
turn further depresses investment. Then a kind of multiplier e¤ect arises. The crash in
house prices directly inuence consumption through transfers Dt and output through the
decrease in o¢ ce input Ot.
Until now, the complete DSGE model has been established. We will log-linearize the
rst order conditions and market clear conditions to study the responses of economic system
to exogenous shocks.
13
III. Calibration and Bayesian Estimation
The time unit in the model is meant to be a quarter. We assign values to the structural
parameters using a combination of calibration and econometric estimation techniques.
We calibrate most parameters using long-run data relations from Hong Kong as well as
parameter values that are common in related studies. We set the quarterly discount factor
 to 0:99, which also pins down the steady state quarterly riskless rate R =  1. The values
assigned to C=Y; Iz=Y;G=Y are 0:6; 0:25 and 0:2 respectively, which are in accord with the
history average of Hong Kong. The share of consumption accruing to entrepreneurslabor
accordingly equals to 0:05. The value assumed for  implies that housing rent expenditure
accounts for 12% of total consumption at the steady state. According to statistics from Hong
Kong Rating and Valuation Department, the annual rate of return for private houses and
private o¢ ces are 4:8% and 8:4% respectively. We therefore set Rh = 1:012 and Ro = 1:021.
As is also within convention, the capital share  is 0:35. We assume rmsquarterly survival
rate is 0:973 according the bankruptcy and merge data of listed companies in Hong Kong.
We set the probability a rm does not change its price within a given period, , equal to 0.75,
implying that the average time between price adjustment is four quarters. In the monetary
policy rule, we set the autoregressive parameter, , to 0.95 and the coe¢ cient  on ination
equal to 2, which are standard and make the interest rate smooth.
The parameters governing the nancial accelerator are similar to those used in BGG.
We dene householdsleverage ratio h as one minus debt to disposable income ratio. We
calibrate it as 1=1:4, which is in line with the average value observed in Hong Kong. Firms
leverage ratio is set as 0:5, the same as BGG. The elasticity of the external nance premium
with respect to leverage is an important parameter in our model as it determines the bor-
rowing ability for rms and households. Since there is no way to identify it in the factual
data, we set this elasticity for households equal to 0:1 following Aoki et al. (2004), and set
it as 0:05 for rms according to BGG. The appendix table presents the calibrated parameter
values.
14
We estimate the remaining parameters of the model using Bayesian methods and Hong
Kong data on output, private consumption and house price index over the period 1980Q1
to 2010Q4. Specically, we estimate seven structural parameters, namely, the ve ratios
or elasticity parameters that can not be calibrated accurately, O=T; ! = w=cr; np; s; , and
parameters dening the stochastic process of shocks, g and a. As Liu et al. (2011), we
impose Beta prior distributions on all structure parameters except s. The mean of these prior
distributions are set as the calibrated values in Aoki et al. (2004). Aoki et al. (2004) argued
that the elasticity of transfer with respect to housing equity changed from 3 to 30 based on
UK history; therefore, we assume that the prior for adjustment factor s in the dividend rule
follows a uniform distribution over [3; 30]. We also estimate three nonstructural parameters,
er; eg; ea, representing the standard deviations of i.i.d. errors with inverse gamma prior
distributions. The prior distributions are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1 also reports the estimates of structural and shock parameters at the posterior
mode along with standard deviations. The steady ratio O=T is estimated as 0:4275, implying
that private o¢ ces occupy 42.75% of the total produced houses. The estimated ratio of
wage to consumption for ROT consumer, !, is 83.36%. The ratio of common consumer,
np, is estimated to 74.02%. These parameters are broadly in line with those reported in
literatures (Aoki et al., 2004; Iacoviello, 2005). The estimated parameter  (0:1060) in
housing production function implies that land value accounts for nearly 90% of housing
values. Davis and Heathcotes (2007) empirical evidence shows that uctuations in real
estate values are primarily driven by changes in land prices. Liu et al.(2011) also regards
land as the main factor in the housing market that their DSGE model focus on land prices
and macroeconomic uctuations. Therefore, we believe the housing production function in
our model is reasonable estimated. Finally, the estimation reveals that the two common
shocks government expenditure shock and technology shock are persistent and have a
modest deviation.
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IV. Model Results Analysis
A. E¤ects of amplication and persistence
So how well does the nancial accelerator work in our world? In this section, we present
some impulse responses of the model to a contractionary monetary policy shock. There are
two ways to evaluate the amplication and persistence e¤ects of our benchmark model.
The rst one is to compare the impulse responses of our model to actual data. From the
results of BVAR model in section 2, the responses of investment to house price shock has the
largest magnitude, followed by the responses of consumption, and that of output is the last.
Besides that, private house price index and private o¢ ce price index response negatively to
a positive shock in interest rate. Those are the results we want to match in our model.
Figure 8 displays the impulse responses of major macroeconomic variables in our bench-
mark model. The shadow areas represent the 68% posterior probability bands. In the linear
equilibrium system, we introduce a positive interest rate shock and generate the impulse
responses of house price, output, consumption and investment. From the perspective of am-
plication e¤ect, house prices, output and consumption all drop by 20%. And investment
drops most, more than 25%. As we switch to persistence e¤ect, consumption takes 10 periods
to recover and output takes 15 periods, and house prices and investment need more than 25
periods to return to steady state. These impulse responses match the BVAR evidences well.
The second way to examine the e¤ects of the model is to compare impulse responses
generated by the benchmark model to those of alternative models which turn o¤ nancial
accelerator in either household sector or entrepreneur sector. The parameters in alternative
models take the same values of those estimated in benchmark model. Figure 9 highlights
the e¤ect on house price, output, consumption and investment when nancial accelerator
turns o¤ in the household sector. Investment drops almost 25%, which is the same as the
benchmark model, whereas the amplication e¤ect on house price, output and consumption
is much weaker, which drops by 17%, 17%, and 15% respectively. Surprisingly, the persis-
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tence of impulse response that takes all variables 40 periods to recover contradicts with our
intuition. In the other alternative model which is showed in gure 10, we correspondingly
is turned o¤ nancial accelerator in entrepreneur sector. Both the amplication and persis-
tence e¤ects become weaker than our benchmark model. The peak responses of house price,
output, consumption and investment to monetary policy shock are 14%, 15%, 17%, and 18%.
As is expected, all variables only need 10 periods to return to steady state. Thus, compared
with these alternative models, the benchmark model has advantages in both amplication
and persistence.
B. What shocks drive the house prices?
Our estimated model helps us assess the relative importance of the shocks in driving
uctuations in house price and macroeconomic variables. We do this through variance de-
compositions. Table 2 reports the results of house prices and several key macroeconomic
variables across the 3 types of structural shocks at forecasting horizons between the impact
period (1Q) and six years after the initial shocks (24Q).
A neutral technology shock (i.e., a TFP shock) contributes little to house price uctua-
tions, though it accounts for a substantial fraction of uctuations in investment, consumption
and output. The reason lies in the fact that it can only move house prices in entrepreneur
sector, thus its impact is much less amplied through nancial acceleration. This nding is
consistent with Liu et al. (2011), who report weak amplication and propagation e¤ects of
macroeconomic variables following a TFP shock after incorporating nancial frictions into
their DSGE model. A shock to government demand explains little of the uctuations in
house prices and key macroeconomic variables. This is intuitive based on the reason that it
can only inuence variables through the increase in demands for nal goods, which is both
indirect and weak.
In contrast, the interest rate shock drives more than 97% of house price uctuations.
Working through nancial accelerators in both households and rms, the interest rate shock
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cases a substantial fraction of uctuations in investment (about 80%), consumption (about
83-90%) and output (about 82-90%). This nding corroborates the results obtained by
Jermann and Quadrini (2009) and Aoki et al. (2004), which showed that nancial shocks
can impact the borrowing ability of rms and households, and thus play important roles in
business cycles.
V. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we study the house prices crash and its inuence on major macroeconomic
variables through the case of Hong Kong during the Southeast Asian nancial crisis. First,
we establish the responses of output, consumption, and investment to the house price shock
using bivariate Bayesian VAR models and identify the interest rate shock as the one that
results in house prices crash. Then in order to implement quantitative studies in a general
equilibrium framework, we build a model with nancial accelerator mechanism exits both in
the household and entrepreneur sectors. The model focuses on the macroeconomic e¤ects of
imperfections in credit markets due to asymmetric information. Such imperfections generate
external nancial premium on households and entrepreneurs when they raise funds to nance
their housing purchase. Moreover, the external nancial premium is a function of net worth,
which heavily depends on house prices. When a positive interest rate shock comes, the
decline in house prices raises the external nancial premium, which leads to a reduction in
housing demand. Thus, the nancial accelerator in both sectors amplies and propagates
the uctuations in house prices and macroeconomic variables.
We use the combination of calibration and Bayesian estimation to assign values to the
structural parameters and compare the impulse responses of our benchmark model with those
of two alternative models. We conclude that our model can match the data well and exert
better e¤ects in both amplication and persistence than models with nancial accelerator
solely exits in household sector or entrepreneur sector.
In the subsequent research we hope to extend our model to work in a small open economy.
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Given the important role of the foreign exchange rate regime in economic activities not
only in Hong Kong, but also in Thailand, South Korea, and Indonesia, with su¢ cient data
preparation in these emerging countries, we would like to investigate the inuence of foreign
exchange rate regime on house prices and other macroeconomic variables.
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Table 1 Prior and Posterior Distribution
Prior Posterior
Parameter Distribution Mean S.D. Mode S.D. T stat.
O=T Beta 0.4 0.1 0.4275 0.1473 2.9028
! Beta 0.6 0.1 0.8336 0.0619 13.4607
np Beta 0.5 0.1 0.7402 0.0589 12.5654
s Uniform 3(min) 30(max) 3.0000 0.0557 53.8546
 Beta 0.4 0.1 0.1060 0.0337 3.1513
g Beta 0.85 0.1 0.7415 0.0449 16.5037
a Beta 0.85 0.1 0.7458 0.0430 17.3546
er Inv. Gamma 0.2 2 0.0236 0.0003 77.2450
eg Inv. Gamma 0.2 2 0.2339 00161 14.5079
ea Inv. Gamma 0.2 2 0.1266 0.0218 5.8028
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Table 2 Variance decompositions of aggregate quantities
Horizon Interest Rate Government Demand TFP (Technology)
House Price
1Q 96.39 0.33 3.28
4Q 98.18 0.21 1.61
8Q 97.92 0.16 1.93
16Q 97.70 0.11 2.18
24Q 97.68 0.10 2.22
Investment
1Q 88.57 0.05 11.38
4Q 79.63 0.11 20.26
8Q 77.57 0.12 22.31
16Q 78.97 0.11 20.92
24Q 80.09 0.10 19.81
Consumption
1Q 97.56 0.00 2.44
4Q 88.14 0.03 11.83
8Q 83.86 0.06 16.09
16Q 83.44 0.06 16.51
24Q 83.74 0.06 16.21
Output
1Q 94.08 0.97 4.95
4Q 85.58 0.74 13.68
8Q 82.62 0.63 16.75
16Q 83.10 0.56 16.33
24Q 83.82 0.53 15.65
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Figure 1: Seasonal adjusted House Prices Index and Consumption from 1995 to 2005, with
the nancial crisis phase represented by the shaded part (i.e., from 1997 Q3 to 1999 Q4).
Figure 2: Seasonal adjusted O¢ ce Price Index and Investment from 1995 to 2005, with the
nancial crisis phase represented by the shaded part (i.e., from 1997 Q3 to 1999 Q4).
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Figure 3: Impluse response to a shock to the interest rate. Note: House price is measured with the
private house price index. Interest rate is measured with the six-month foreign exchange funds rate. Solid
lines represent the estimated responses from a bivariate BVAR model based on monthly data from January
1995 to December 1999. Darked parts represent the 68% posterior probability bands.
Figure 4: Impulse responses to a shock to the interest rate. Note: O¢ ce price is measured with
the private o¢ ce price index. Interest rate is measured with the six-month foreign exchange funds rate. Solid
lines represent the estimated responses from a bivariate BVAR model based on monthly data from January
1995 to December 1999. Darked parts represent the 68% posterior probability bands.
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Figure 5: Impulse responses to a shock to the house price index. Note: House price is measured
with the private house price index. Solid lines represent the estimated responses from a bivariate BVARmodel
based on quarterly data from 1980 Q1 to 2010 Q4. Darked parts represent the 68% posterior probability
bands.
Figure 6: Impulse response to a shock to the house price index. Note: House price is measured
with the private house price index. Interest rate is measured with the six-month foreign exchange funds rate.
Solid lines represent the estimated responses from a bivariate BVAR model based on quarterly data from
1980 Q1 to 2010 Q4. Darked parts represent the 68% posterior probability bands.
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Figure 7: Impulse responses to a shock to o¢ ce price index. Note: O¢ ce price is measured with
the private o¢ ce price index. Interest rate is measured with the six-month foreign exchange funds rate. Solid
lines represent the estimated responses from a bivariate BVAR model based on quarterly data from 1986Q1
to 2010Q4. Darked parts represent the 68% posterior probability bands.
Figure 8: Impulse responses to a shock to the interest rate
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Figure 9: Impulse responses to a shock to the interest rate after turning o¤ the nancial
accelerator in household sector
Figure 10: Impulse responses to a shock to the interest rate after turning o¤ the nancial
accelerator in entrepreneur sector
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A Appendix: The Complete Log-Linearized Model
1. Aggregate demand
(A1) yt =
c
Y
ct +
Ce
Y
cet +
Iz
Y
iz;t +
G
Y
gt
(A2) Cpt =  rt+1 + Cpt+1
(A3) Crt = !wt + (1  !)dt
(A4) Ct = npC
p
t + (1  np)Crt
(A5) ct = Ct   xc;t
(A6a) ht = Ct   xh;t
(A7) xct = #x
h
t
(A8) rht+1 = rt   h
 
nht+1   qt   ht+1

(A9) rht+1 = (1  h)xht + hqt+1   qt
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(A10) dt = s(nht+1   qt   ht+1)
(A11) rht+1 = rt   o
 
net+1   qt   ot+1

(A12) rht+1 = (1  o)(yt+1   ot+1 + xct+1   xt+1) + oqt+1   qt
(A13) qt = (1  )iz;t + xc;t
(A14) tt =
O
T
ot +
h
T
ht
(A15) cet = (1=
o)rot + (1  1=o) rt +

1 + o
o   1
o

net 1   o
o   1
o
(qt 1 + ot)
2. Aggregate supply
(A16) yt = at + (1  )mt + ot
(A17) wt = yt  mt   xt + xc;t
(A18) Cpt + 'm
p
t = wt
(A19) mt = m
p
t
28
(A20) zt = iz;t
(A21) t = ( xt) + t+1
3. The evolution of state variables
net+1 =  Ro[(1=o)rot + (1  1=o)rt +
(1 + o
o   1
o
)net 1   o
o   1
o
(qt 1 + ot)](A22)
(A23) t = (1  )tt 1 + zt
4. Monetary policy and shock processes
(A24) rnt = r
n
t 1 + (1  )t 1 + ernt
(A25) gt = ggt 1 + e
g
t
(A26) at = aat 1 + e
a
t
(A27) rnt = rt + t+1
(A1) is the goods market clearing. (A2) and (A3) are the consumers rst-order condi-
tions for consumption. (A4) is the aggregate consumption of normal consumers and ROT
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consumers. The demand for nondurable goods and house services are (A5) and (A6a). (A7)
is the price relationship. The external nance premium for homeowners and entrepreneurs
are (A8) and (A11). The denitions of return for house and o¢ ce are respectively (A9) and
(A12). (A10) represents the transfer rule. (A13) is the house price denition and (A14) is
the house market clearing. The entrepreneurs consumption is (A15).
(A16) is the production function. The combination of (A17), (A18) and (A19) is the
labor market clearing conditions. (A20) is the house production function. The New Keyne-
sian Phillips Curve is (A21). (??), (??) and (A23) are the law of motions for homeowners
net worth, entrepreneurs net worth and house stock. (A24) is Taylor rule. The exogenous
process of government expenditure and productivity are (A25) and (A26). (A27) is the
denition of real interest rate.
30
B Appendix: Parameters Calibration
c
Y
0.6
Ce
Y
0.05
IZ
Y
0.25
G
Y
0.1
 1
# =  1 

-0.14
h = f
0
(h)
f(h)
h 0.1
o = 
0
(o)
(o)
o 0.05
h 1/1.4
o 0.5
h = 1 
Rh
0.978
o = 1 
Ro
0.969
 0.35
 0.01
 0.973
 0.75
 0.99
 0.0858
 2
' 1
Rh 1.012
Ro 1.021
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